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Abstract
We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems
in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time.
At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which inﬂuences the
evolution of his valuation process. The leading example is the repeated sales of a good or a
service.
We derive the optimal dynamic mechanism, analyze its qualitative structure and frequently
derive its closed form solution. This enables us to compare the distortion in various settings. In
particular, we discuss the cases where the type of each agent follows an arithmetic or geometric
Brownian motion or a mean reverting process. We show that depending on the nature of the
private information the distortion might increase or decrease over time.
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1

Introduction

1.1

Motivation

We analyze the nature of the optimal, revenue-maximizing, contract, in a dynamic environment with
private information at the initial time of contracting as well as in all future periods. We consider a
setting in continuous time and are mostly concerned with environments where the uncertainty, and
in particular the private information of the agent is described by a Brownian motion. The present
work makes progress by considering allocation problems that we refer to as weakly time separable.
Namely, (i) the set of available allocations at time t is independent of the history of allocations
and (ii) the ﬂow utility function of the agent and the principal at time t depend only the initial
and the current private information of the agent (and hence the qualiﬁer of weakly time separable).
The beneﬁcial implications for the analysis of the optimal dynamic mechanism that come with the
restriction to weakly time separable environment were already established in earlier work, notably
in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a), with additional results in the online appendix, Pavan, Segal,
and Toikka (2014b), where they deﬁne a corresponding separable environment.
With time separability, the allocation rule that maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus
has the property that the allocation at time t is a function of the report of the agent at time 0 and
time t only. As a result, at every time t > 0, each agent is only facing a static reporting problem
since the current report is only used to determine the current allocation. A notable implication of
this separability is that the incentive compatibility conditions can be decomposed completely into a
time 0 problem and a sequence of static problem at all times t > 0. This decomposition is possible
in either discrete time as established earlier by Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) or in continuous
time as established here. The restriction to time separable allocation problems is suﬃciently mild to
include many of the allocation problems explicitly analyzed in the literature so far, for the example
the optimal quantity provision by the monopolist as in Battaglini (2005) or the auction environment
of Eső and Szentes (2007).
The speciﬁc contribution of the continuous time setting to the analysis of the optimal mechanism
arises after establishing the necessary conditions for optimality under time separability. And in fact,
we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions by using the envelope theorem using a small class of relevant
deviations which is precisely the approach taken in discrete time, see for Eső and Szentes (2007) and
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Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) for the seminal contributions. The resulting dynamic version of
the virtual utility accounts for the inﬂuence that the present private information has on the future
state of the world (and hence future private information of the agent) through a term that Pavan,
Segal, and Toikka (2014a) refer to as impulse response function. Now, in continuous time, the
equivalent expression, which is commonly referred to as stochastic ﬂow, is compact and summarizes
the nature of the underlying stochastic process in an explicit formula. We then make use of the
information conveyed by the stochastic ﬂow in three distinct ways.
First, we explicitly derive the nature of the optimal allocation policy and the associated transfer
rules. We consider in some detail a number of well-known stochastic processes, in particular the
arithmetic and the geometric Brownian motion. The natural starting point here is to consider the
case in which the private information of the agent is the current state of the process, in particular
the initial state of the Brownian motion is private information, but we also analyze the problem
when either the drift or volatility of the process are private information. In Section 5 we consider
the nature of the optimal mechanism for repeated sales when the type of the agent follows a
geometric Brownian motion. We establish that commonly observed contracts such as ﬂat rates, free
consumption units, two-part tariﬀs and leasing contracts emerge as features of the optimal contract
design.
Second, we derive suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of the dynamic mechanism in terms
of the primitives of the stochastic process. This is demonstrated in detail in Section 6 where
we, for example, derive suﬃcient conditions for optimality when the private information of agent
cannot be ordered by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. In particular, we can allow the variance
rather than the mean of the stochastic process to form the private information, and yet display
transparent suﬃcient conditions for optimality. In much of the earlier literature, the types had
to be assumed to be ordered according to ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance in order to give rise to
suﬃcient conditions for optimality.
Third, and ﬁnally, we systematically extend the analysis from Markovian settings where the
initial private information (as well as any future private information) is the state of the stochastic
process to settings in which the initial private information can present a structural parameter
of the stochastic process. The resulting environment then fails to be Markovian as the law of
motion is determined both by the current state and the structural parameter of the stochastic
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process. But importantly, the initial information about the parameter of the process and the
ongoing information about the state of the process still conforms with our restriction to weakly
time separable environments.
The initial private information may represent the drift or the volatility of the Brownian motion,
or the long-run mean or the reversion rate of a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. The
resulting informational term in the virtual utility, which is referred to as generalized stochastic ﬂow
in probability theory, still permits a compact representation that can be used for the determination
of the optimal policy and/or for the suﬃcient conditions. With the notable exception of the recent
papers by Boleslavksy and Said (2013) and Skrzypacz and Toikka (2015), and a discussion in the
supplementary appendix of Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a), the earlier contributions with an
inﬁnite horizon did not allow for the possibility that the very structure of the stochastic process
may constitute the private information. Interestingly, the continuous time version of this generalized
impulse response function is often a deterministic function of the initial state and time, whereas the
corresponding discrete time process has a generalized impulse response function that depends on
the realization of the entire sample path. This is shown for example in Section 5 where the initial
private information is the mean of the geometric Brownian motion. The discrete time counterpart
of this process, namely the multiplicative random walk, was analyzed earlier by Boleslavksy and
Said (2013). Here the generalized impulse response term involves the number of realized upticks and
downticks. In the continuous time equivalent, the generalized stochastic ﬂow is simply the expected
number of upticks or downticks which is a deterministic function of time and the initial state.
We should add that the current focus on time separable allocation problems is restrictive in
that it excludes problems such as the optimal timing of a sale of a durable good, where the present
decision, say a sale, naturally preempts certain future decision, say a sale, again. But our setting
allows us to restrict attention to a small class of deviations, deviations that we call consistent. The
consistent deviations, by themselves only necessary conditions, nonetheless completely describe the
indirect utility of the agent in any incentive compatible mechanism. More precisely, at time zero
the initial shock of the agent is drawn and the initial shock determines the probability measure
of the entire future valuation process. If the agent deviates he changes the probability measure of
the reported valuation process. To avoid working with the change in measures directly we restrict
attention to consistent deviations. We call a deviation consistent if, after his initial misreport, say
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b instead of a, the agent reports his valuation as if it would follow the same Brownian motion as
the one which drives his true valuation. As there is a true initial shock, namely b, which could have
made these subsequent reports truthful, the principal cannot detect such a deviation and is forced
to assign the allocation and transfer process of the imitated shock b. In particular, this allows us to
evaluate the payoﬀs of the truthful and the consistently deviating agent with respect to the same
expectation operator. Now, as we assume the initial shock to be one dimensional and given that
all deviations are parametrized over the time zero shock, standard mechanism design arguments
deliver the smoothness of the value function of the agent.
Within the large class of time separable allocation policies we can rewrite the suﬃciency conditions exclusively in terms of the ﬂow virtual utilities. By using the class of consistent deviations
and allowing for time separable allocation policies, we can completely avoid the veriﬁcation of the
incentive compatibility conditions via backward induction methods which was the basic instrument
to establish the suﬃcient conditions used in much of the preceding literature with dynamic adverse
selection.

1.2

Related Literature

The analysis of the revenue maximizing contract in an environment where the private information
may change over time appears ﬁrst in Baron and Besanko (1984). They considered a two period
model of a regulator facing a monopolist with unknown, but in every period, constant marginal
cost. Besanko (1985) oﬀers an extension to a ﬁnite horizon environment with a general cost function, where the unknown parameter is either distributed independently and identically over time,
or follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. Since these early contributions, the literature has
developed rapidly. Courty and Li (2000) consider the revenue maximizing contract in a sequential
screening problem where the preferences of the buyer change over time. Battaglini (2005) considered a quantity discriminating monopolist who provides a menu of choices to a consumer whose
valuation can change over time according to a commonly known Markov process. In contrast to
the earlier work, he explicitly considered an inﬁnite time horizon and showed that the distortion
due to the initial private information vanishes over time. Eső and Szentes (2007) rephrased the two
period sequential screening problem by showing that the additional signal arriving in period two
can always be represented by a signal that is orthogonal to the signal in period one. Eső and Szentes
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(2014) generalize this insight in an inﬁnite horizon environment and show that the information rent
of the agent is only due to his initial information.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) consider a general environment in an inﬁnite horizon setting
and allowing for general allocation problems, encompassing the earlier literature (with continuous
type spaces). They obtain general necessary conditions for incentive compatibility and present a
variety of suﬃcient conditions for revenue maximizing contracts for speciﬁc classes of environments.
A feature common to almost all of the above contributions is that the private information of the
agent is represented by the current state of a Markov process, and that the new information that
the agent receives is controlled by the current state, and in turn, leads to a new state of the Markov
process. Notably, Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a), Boleslavksy and Said (2013) and Skrzypacz
and Toikka (2015) allowed for the possibility that the very structure of the stochastic process
may constitute the private information. For example, Boleslavksy and Said (2013) let the initial
private information of the agent be the mean of a multiplicative random walk. Interestingly, this
dramatically changes the impact that the initial private information has on the future allocations.
In particular, the distortions in the future allocation may now increase over time rather than decline
as in much of the earlier literature. The reason is that the inﬂuence of the structural parameter,
such as the drift or the variance, on the valuation may increase with the time horizon.1 Finally,
Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2013) consider a class of dynamic allocation problems, a suitable
generalization of the single unit allocation problem and impose a separability condition (additive or
multiplicative) on the interaction of the initial private information and all subsequent signals. The
separability condition allows them to obtain an explicit characterization of the revenue maximizing
contract and derive transparent suﬃcient conditions for the optimal contract.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we
derive the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the revenue maximizing contract. In Section 4 we
analyze the implications of the revenue maximizing contract for the structure of the intertemporal
distortions. The nature of the optimal contract for repeat purchases of a product or service is
analyzed in Section 5 in an environment where the type follows a geometric Brownian motion.
1

In a recent contribution, Garrett and Pavan (2012) also exhibit the possibility of increasing distortions over time,

but the source there is a trade-oﬀ in the retention decision of a known agent versus a hiring decision of new, hence
less well known agent.
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Section 6 examines the optimal allocation among competing bidders when the private valuation is
either driven by the arithmetic Brownian motion or the mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of open issues. The Appendix contains some auxiliary
proofs and additional results.

2

Model

There are n agents indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n} = N . Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, T ],
where the time horizon T can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. If the time horizon is inﬁnite, then we assume a
discount rate r ∈ R+ which is strictly positive, r > 0.
The ﬂow preferences of agent i are represented by a quasilinear utility function:
vti · ui (t, xit ) − pit .

(1)

The function u : R+ × R+ → [0, u] is continuous and strictly increasing in x, decreasing in t and
satisﬁes u(t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ R+ . We refer to u(t, xit ) as the valuation of xit ∈ [0, x] ⊂ R+ with
0 ≤ x < ∞. The allocation xit can be interpreted as either the quantity or quality of a good that
is allocated to agent i at time t. The type of agent i in period t is given by vti ∈ R+ and the ﬂow
utility in period t is given by the product of the type and the valuation. The payment in period t
is denoted by pit ∈ R.
The type vti of agent i at time t depends on his initial shock θi at time t = 0 and the contemporaneous shock Wti at time t:
vti  φi (t, θi , Wti ) .

(2)

Note, that the initial private information θ need not to be the initial type v0i , but might be any
other characteristic determining the probability measure over paths of the types (vt )t∈R+ . In the
case of the Brownian this might be the initial value, the drift, or the variance, in the case of a mean
reverting process this might be the mean reversion speed or the long run-average. At time zero
each agent privately learns his initial shock θi ∈ (θ, θ̄) = Θ ⊆ R, which is drawn from a common
prior distribution F i : R → [0, 1], independently across agents.
The distribution F i has a strictly positive density f i > 0 with decreasing inverse hazard rate
(1 − F i ) /f i . The contemporaneous shock is given by a random process (Wti )t∈R+ of agent i that
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changes over time as a consequence of a sequence of incremental shocks and Wti is assumed to be
independent of Wtj for every j = i. The function φi : R+ ×Θ×R → R aggregates the initial shock θi
and the contemporaneous Wti of agent i into his type vti . In Sections 5 and 6, the valuation function
ui (t, xit ) is simply a linear function ui (t, xit ) = xit and the type vti can then be directly interpreted
as the marginal willingness to pay of agent i.
The function φi is twice diﬀerentiable in every direction and in the following we use a small
annotation for partial derivatives, i.e.
φiθ (t, θ, w) 

∂φi (t, θ, w)
.
∂θ

(3)

If θi is the initial value of the process of agent i, that is v0i = θi , then the derivative φiθ is commonly
referred to as the stochastic ﬂow ; or generalized stochastic ﬂow if θi determines the evolution of a
diﬀusion by inﬂuencing the drift or variance term (see for example Kunita (1997)). The stochastic
ﬂow process (φiθ (t, θ, Wti ))t∈R+ is the analogue of the impulse response functions described in the
discrete time dynamic mechanism design literature (see Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a), Deﬁnition
3). As we will see in the examples presented later the stochastic ﬂow is of a very simple form for
many classical continuous time diﬀusion processes, like the arithmetic and geometric Brownian
motion.
We assume that for every agent i a higher initial shock θi leads to a higher type, i.e. φiθ (t, θ, w) ≥
0 and an agent i who observed a higher value of the process Wti has a higher type, i.e. φiw (t, θ, w) > 0
for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.
Assumption 1 (Decreasing Inﬂuence of Initial Shock).
The relative impact of the initial shock on the type:
φiθ (t, θ, w)
φi (t, θ, w)

(4)

is decreasing in w for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.
Assumption 2 (Decreasing Inﬂuence of Initial vs Contemporaneous Shock).
The ratio of the marginal impact of initial and contemporaneous shocks:
φiθ (t, θ, w)
φiw (t, θ, w)
is decreasing in θ for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.

(5)
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The last assumption implies that the type with a large initial shock is inﬂuenced more by the
contemporaneous shocks that arrive after time zero.
Assumption 3 (Finite Expected Impact of the Initial Shock).
The expected inﬂuence of the initial shock on the type grows at most exponentially, i.e. there exists
two constants C ∈ R+ , q ∈ (0, r) such that E [φiθ (t, θi , Wti )] ≤ Ceqt for all t ∈ R+ and θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 3 ensures that the eﬀect of a marginal change in the agent’s type on the sum of
discounted expected future types is ﬁnite.2
At every point in time t the principal chooses an allocation xt ∈ X from a compact, convex set
X ⊂ Rn+ , where xit can be interpreted as the quantity or quality of a good that is allocated to agent
i at time t. We assume that it is always possible to allocate zero to an agent, i.e.
x ∈ X ⇒ (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , 0, xi+1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ X .
To ensure that the problem is well posed we assume that for every feasible allocation process
xi = (xit ) gives ﬁnite expected utility to agent i, i.e.

 T
−rt
i i
i
i
e 1{vti ≥0} vt u (t, xt )dt | θ < ∞,
E
0

for every θi in the support of F . The principal receives the sum of discounted ﬂow payments

i
i∈N pt minus the production costs c(xt ):


T

e−rt
pit − c (xt ) dt .
(6)
E
0

i∈N

The cost c : X → R+ is continuous and increasing in every component with c (0) = 0.
Deﬁnition 1 (Value Function).
The indirect utility, or value function, V i (θi ) of agent i given his initial shock θi , his consumption
process (xit )t∈R+ and his payment process (pit )t∈R+ is

 T
i i
−rt
i
i i
i
i
u (t, xt )vt − pt dt | θ .
V (θ ) = E
e

(7)

0

2

Assumption 3 is weaker than the assumption of a process with bounded impulse responses as discussed in Pavan,

Segal, and Toikka (2014a), as the later would correspond to φiθ being uniformly bounded. The present assumption
rather than the bounded impulse responses has the advantage that it clude many processes such as the geometric
Brownian motion, which the former would exclude.
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A contract speciﬁes an allocation process (xt )t∈R+ and a payment process (pt )t∈R+ . The allocation
xt and the payment pt can depend on all types reported (vsi )s≤t,i∈N by the agents prior to time t.
We assume that the agent has an outside option of zero and thus require the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 (Incentive and Participation Constraints).
A contract (xt , pt )t∈R+ is acceptable if for every agent i it is individually rational to accept the
contract
V i (θi ) ≥ 0 for all θi ∈ Θ ,
and it is optimal to report his shock θi and his type (vti )t∈R+ truthfully at every point in time t ∈ R+ .
Given the transferable utility, we deﬁne the ﬂow welfare function s : R+ × Rn × X → R that
maps an allocation x ∈ X and a vector of types v ∈ Rn into the associated ﬂow of welfare
s(t, v, x) =



vti ui (t, xi ) − c(x) .

(8)

i∈N

The social value of the allocation process (xt )t∈[0,T ] aggregates the discounted ﬂow of social welfare
over time and is given by:



T

−rt
i i
i
E
e
vt u (t, xt ) − c (xt ) dt = E
0

i∈N



T
0

e

−rt

s(t, vt , xt )dt .

(9)

As the allocation xt at time t does not inﬂuence the future evolution of types or the set of possible
future allocations the problem of ﬁnding a socially eﬃcient allocation is time-separable. We deﬁne
the optimal allocation function x† : R+ × Rn → Rn that maps a point in time t and a vector of
types v into the set of optimal allocations
x† (t, v) = arg max s(t, v, x) .
x∈X

(10)

An allocation process (xt )t∈[0,T ] is welfare maximizing if and only if xt ∈ x† (t, vt ) almost surely for
every t ∈ [0, T ].
Given the essentially static character of the social allocation problem, it follows immediately
that the welfare maximizing allocation x† can be implemented via a sequence of static VickreyClarke-Groves mechanisms and associated payments:
p†t i

†i

 p (t, vt ) = max
x∈X


j=i

j

†



u (t, x) − u (t, x (t, vt )) vtj − c(x) + c(x† (t, vt )) .
j

(11)
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3

Revenue Maximization

In this section we derive a revenue maximizing direct mechanism. Without loss of generality we
restrict attention to direct mechanisms, where every agent i reports his initial shock θi and his type
vti truthfully. We ﬁrst obtain a revenue equivalence result for incentive compatible mechanisms.

3.1

Necessity

We begin by establishing that the value function of the agent if he reports truthfully is Lipschitz
continuous. As φi is strictly increasing in w we can implicitly deﬁne the function ω : R+ ×Θ×R → R
by
v i = φi (t, θi , ω(t, θi , v i )) for all (t, θi ) ∈ R+ × Θ .

(12)

Thus ω identiﬁes the value that the contemporaneous shock Wti has to have at time t to generate
a contemporaneous type v i given the initial shock θi . We derive a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility that is based only on the robustness of the mechanism to a small class of deviations,
which we refer to as consistent deviations.
Deﬁnition 3 (Consistent Deviation).
A deviation by agent i is referred to as a consistent deviation if an agent with type v0i = φi (0, a, W0i )
(and associated initial shock a ∈ Θ) misreports v0i = φi (0, b, W0i ) (and associated initial shock b ∈ Θ)
at t = 0 and continues to misreport:
vti = φi (t, b, ω(t, a, vti )),

(13)

instead of his true type vti at all future dates t ∈ R+ .
Thus, an agent who misreports with a consistent deviation, continues to misreport his true type
vti in all future periods. More precisely, agent i’s reported type v̂ti = φi (t, b, Wti ) equals the type
he would have had if his initial shock would have been b instead of a. We note that the misreport
generated by a consistent deviation has the property that the principal can infer from the misreport
the true realized path of the contemporaneous shocks Wti . Now, since the allocation depends on
the type vti rather than the path of contemporaneous shocks Wti , the (inferred) truthfulness in the
shocks is not of immediate use for the principal. We now show that this, one-dimensional, class
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of consistent deviations is suﬃcient to uniquely pin down the value function of the agent in any
incentive compatible mechanism at time t = 0. The class of consistent deviations we consider here
are not local deviations at one point in time, but rather represent a global deviation in the sense
that the agent changes his reports at every point in time.
As φi (0, θ, W0 ) is strictly increasing in θ, it is convenient to describe the initial report directly
in terms of the true initial shock a and the reported initial shock b. We thus deﬁne V i (a, b) to be
the indirect utility of agent i with initial shock a but who reports shock b and misreports his type
consistently as v̂ti = φi (t, b, ω(t, a, vti )). Note that by construction Wti = ω(t, a, vti ). Consequently
the allocation agent i gets by consistently deviating and reporting b is the same allocation that he
would get if his initial shock were b and he were to report it truthfully. Hence V i (a, b) is the indirect
utility of an agent who has the initial shock a but reports initial shock b and misreports his type
consistently and is given by:

V (a, b) = E



T

i

e

0

−rt

u

i

(t, xit (b))φi (t, a, Wti )

−

pit (b)

dt .

Note, that when restricted to consistent deviations the mechanism design problem turns into a
standard one-dimensional problem, and the Envelope theorem yields the derivative of the indirect
utility function of the agent:
Proposition 1 (Regularity of Value Function).
The indirect utility function V i of every agent i ∈ N in any incentive compatible mechanism is
Lipschitz continuous and has the weak derivative
 T

i
−rt i
i
i
i
i
Vθ (θ) = E
e u (t, xt (θ))φθ (t, θ , Wt )dt a.e. .

(14)

0

Proof. As the agent can always use consistent deviations, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is V (a, a) = supb V (a, b) . As φi is diﬀerentiable the derivative of V with respect to the
ﬁrst variable is given by
 T

∂
−rt
i
i
i
i
i
Va (a, b) =
u (t, xt (b))φ (t, a, Wt ) − pt (b) dt
E
e
∂a
0


 T
−rt
i
i
i
i
u (t, xt (b))φθ (t, a, Wt ) dt ≤ u E
e
= E
0

T
0


e−rt φiθ (t, a, Wti )dt

,

which is bounded by a constant by Assumption 3. By the Envelope theorem (see Milgrom and
Segal (2002), Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) we have that V i (θ) = V i (θ, θ) is absolutely continuous an
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the (weak) derivative is given by (14). As argued above (14) is bounded and thus V i is Lipschitz
continuous.
We introduce the virtual value function J i : R+ × Θ × R → R as:
J i (t, θi , v i ) = v i −

1 − F (θi ) i
φθ (t, θi , w(t, θi , v i )) .
f (θi )

(15)

We observe that the above virtual value is modiﬁed relative to its static version only by the term
of the stochastic ﬂow φiθ that multiplies the inverse hazard rate. Thus, the speciﬁc impact of the
private information in the dynamic mechanism is going to arrive exclusively through the stochastic
ﬂow φiθ (see (3)), the continuous time equivalent of the impulse response function. The properties
of the virtual value are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of the Virtual Value).
If the virtual value J i (t, θi , v i ) is positive then it is non-decreasing in θi and v i .
The proof of Proposition 2 given in the Appendix establishes the monotonicity of the virtual value
from Assumptions 1 and 2 using algebraic arguments. We observe that Proposition 2 establishes
the monotonicity of the virtual value only for the case that the virtual value is positive. In fact, our
assumptions are not strong enough to ensure the monotonicity of the virtual valuation independent
of its sign. The reason not to impose stronger monotonicity conditions is that for many important
examples discussed later (for example the geometric Brownian motion with unknown initial value)
the virtual value is only monotone if positive.
We can now establish a revenue equivalence result that describes the revenue of the principal in
any incentive compatible mechanism solely in terms of the allocation process x = (xt )t∈R+ and the
expected time zero value the lowest type derives from the contract V i (θ).
Theorem 1 (Revenue Equivalence).
For any incentive compatible direct mechanism the expected payoﬀ of the principal depends only on
the allocation process (xt )t∈R+ and is given by the virtual value:




T
T



e−rt
pit − c(xt ) dt = E
e−rt
J i (t, θti , vti )ui (t, xit ) − c(xt ) dt −
V i (θ). (16)
E
0

i∈N

0

i∈N

i∈N
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Proof. Partial integration gives that in any incentive compatible mechanism (x, p) the expected
transfer received by the principal from agent i equals the expected virtual value of agent i :
 T

 T
  θ
−rt i
−rt i
i i
E
e pt dt = E
e u (t, xt )vt dt −
f (θi )V i (θi )dθi
0


=E

=E

0

T
0
T
0





θ

1 − F (θi ) i i i
Vθ (θ )dθ − V i (θ)
i)
f
(θ
θ

 
1 − F (θi ) i
−rt i
i
i
i
i
e u (t, xt ) vt −
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) dt − V i (θ) .
f (θi )
e−rt ui (t, xit )vti dt −

θ

f (θi )

Summing up the transfers of all agents and subtracting the cost gives the result.
As Theorem 1 provides a necessary condition for incentive compatibility it follows that if there
exists an incentive compatible contract (x, p) such that the allocation process x maximizes the
expected virtual value given by (16) it maximizes the principal’s surplus. Clearly, to maximize the
virtual surplus it is optimal to set the transfer to the lowest initial shock equal to zero: V i (θ) = 0
for all agents i ∈ N . The revenue of the principal deﬁned by (16) equals the expected welfare when
true types are replaced with virtual values:
 T

−rt
E
e s(t, J(t, θt , vt ), xt )dt ,

(17)

0

where we deﬁned the ﬂow social value s (·) earlier in (8). In the next step we establish that there
exists a direct mechanism that maximizes the expected virtual value deﬁned in (16). To do so let
us ﬁrst state the following result which ensures that there exists a time separable allocation that
maximizes the virtual value:
Proposition 3 (Virtual Value Maximizing Allocation).
There exists an allocation function x : R+ × Θ × Rn → X such that the process
xt  xt (t, θ, vt )
maximizes the expected virtual value of the principal deﬁned in (15). Furthermore, the allocation
x i (t, θ, vt ) of agent i is non-decreasing in his type vti and his initial type θi .
Proof. For every t, θ, vt there exists a non-empty set of allocations which maximize the ﬂow of
virtual values,
X  (t, θ, vt ) = arg max s(t, J(t, θ, vt ), x) = arg max
x∈X

x∈X


j∈N

J j (t, θj , vtj )uj (t, xj ) − c(x),
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and we denote by J(t, θ, vt ) ∈ Rn the vector of virtual valuations, i.e. J(t, θ, vt )i = J i (t, θi , vti ). As ui
and c are increasing in xi is is optimal to set the consumption of agent i to zero xi = 0 if his virtual
value J i (t, θi , vti ) is negative. As ui is increasing in x and J i is increasing in θi and v i by Proposition

2 it follows that the objective function of the principal i∈N max{0, J i (t, θi , vti )}ui (t, xi ) − c(x) is
super-modular in (θi , xi ) and (vti , xi ). By Topkis’ theorem, there exists a quantity x (t, θ, vt ) ∈
X  (t, θ, vt ) that maximizes the ﬂow virtual value such that the allocation x i (t, θ, vt ) of agent i is
non-decreasing in θi and vti . As the virtual value of the principal at time t depends only on t, the
initial reports θ, and the type vt , this ﬂow allocation that conditions only on (t, θ, vt ) is an optimal
allocation process:

sup E
(xt )

3.2



T
0

e

−rt

s(t, J

i

(t, θti , vti ), xt )dt


=E



T
0

e

−rt

sup s(t, J

x∈X

i

(t, θti , vti ), xt )dt

.

Suﬃciency

To prove incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation process let us ﬁrst establish a version of
a classic result in static mechanism design.
Proposition 4 (Static Implementation).
Let y ⊂ R and let β : Y × Y → R be absolutely continuous in the ﬁrst variable with weak derivative
β1 : Y × Y → R+ and let β1 be increasing in the second variable. Then the payment
 y
p(y) = β(y, y) −
β1 (z, z)dz .
0

ensures that truth-telling is optimal, i.e. β(y, y) − p(y) ≥ β(y, ŷ) − p(ŷ) for all y, ŷ ∈ Y .
Proposition 4 is similar to Lemma 1 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) and Proposition 2
in Rochet (1987) and diﬀers only in the continuity requirements, absolute continuous rather than
Lipschitz continuous.
In the ﬁrst step we construct ﬂow payments that make truthful reporting of types optimal (on
and oﬀ the equilibrium path) if the virtual value maximizing allocation process x is implemented.
Deﬁne the payment process pt  p(t, θ, vt ) where the ﬂow payment pi : t × Θ × Rn → R of agent i
is given by:


p (t, θ, vt ) 
i

vti

u (t, x (t, θ, vt )) −
i

vti

i

0

ui (t, x i (t, θ, (vt−i , z)))dz .
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Proposition 5 (Incentive Compatible Transfers).
In the contract (x , p) it is optimal for every agent at every point in time t > 0 to report his type
vti truthfully, irrespective of the reported shock θ and past reported types (vs )s<t .
Proof. As the allocation x (t, θ, vt ) and the payment p(t, θ, vt ) at time t are independent of all past
reported types (vs )s<t the reporting problem of the agent is time-separable. As ui is increasing in
x, and x is increasing in v i by Proposition 2, we can apply Proposition 4 to
(v i , v̂ i ) → v i ui (t, x (t, θ, (v̂ i , v −i ))) ,
and so guarantee that the payment scheme p(t, θ, v) makes truthful reporting of types optimal for
all t, θ, v, v̂ i .
It remains to augment the payments from Proposition 5 with additional payments that make
it optimal for the agents to report their initial shocks θ truthfully. Note, that as the payments
from Proposition 5 ensure truthful reporting of types even after initial misreports, we know how
agents will behave even after an initial deviation. This insight transforms the time zero reporting
problem into a static design problem in which the payments from Proposition 4 can be used to
provide incentives.
Deﬁne the payment process
Pt  p(t, θ, vt ) + m(θ)

(18)

where the ﬁxed ﬂow payment mi : Θ → R of agent i is given by:
 T
 vti
re−rt
i
ui (t, x i (t, θ, (z, vt−i )))dz
m (θ) = E
−rT
1
−
e
0
0
 θi
 
i
i i
i
−i
i
i
−i
−
φθ (t, z, Wt )u (t, x (t, (z, θ ), (φ (t, z, Wt ), v )))dz dt .
θ

Theorem 2 (Revenue Maximizing Contract).
In the virtual value maximizing contract (x , P  ) it is optimal for every agent at every point in time
t > 0 to report his shock θi and type vti truthfully, irrespective of the reported shocks θ and past
reported types (vs )s<t .
Proof. Start with the ﬂow payments p of Proposition 5. By construction of the payments each agent
reports his type truthfully independent of his initial report θ. Let V̂ (θi , θ̂i ) be the agent’s value if
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his true initial shock is θi but he reports θ̂i and reports truthful after time zero
 T
 
i i
−rt
i i
i
i −i
i −i
e
vt u (t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt )) − p(t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt ) dt .
V̂ (θ , θ̂ ) = E
0

As it is optimal to report vti truthfully we have that

∂  i i
i
i −i
i −i
u
(t,
x
(t,
(
θ̂
,
θ
),
v
))
−
p(t,
(
θ̂
,
θ
),
v
)
= ui (t, x (t, (θ̂i , θ−i ), vt )) .
v
t
t
∂vti t
Thus, the derivative of agent i’s value with respect to his initial shock is given by
 T
 
i i
−rt
i
i
i
i
i
i −i
e
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) u (t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt )) dt .
V̂θi (θ , θ̂ ) = E
0

As φiθ is positive, ui is increasing in x, and x i is increasing in θ̂i by Proposition 2, Proposition
4 implies that truthful reporting of θi is optimal for agent i if he has to make a payment of
mi (θ)(1 − e−r T )/r at time zero. As the principal can commit to payments we can transform this
payment into a constant ﬂow payment with the same discounted present value by multiplying with
r/(1 − e−r T ). Note, that as the payment m(θ) does not depend on the types it is optimal for the
agent to report his types truthfully in the contract (x , P  ) where Pt  p(t, θ, vt ) + m(θ).
Theorem 2 describes a revenue maximizing direct mechanism where the agent reports his types
and the principal decides on a price and an allocation at every point in time. The next result shows
that in the case of a single agent there also exists a simple indirect mechanism in the form of a
two-part tariﬀ that which maximizes revenue.
In this mechanism the agent picks a contract at time zero and chooses how much to consume at
every point in time. The price paid by the agent at time t for his consumption at time t depends
only the initial contract choice through the ﬁxed payment and the level of consumption xt at time
t through the variable payment, and thus takes the form of a two-part tariﬀ.
Proposition 6 (Two-Part Tariﬀ).
Consider the single agent case. There exist a revenue maximizing two-part tariﬀ, where at time zero
the agent communicates θ truthfully and then at every point in time t chooses his consumption xt
and pays p̃(t, θ, xt ) .
Proof. Deﬁne the set of types such that a given allocation x is optimal at time t
V  (t, θ, x) = {v ∈ R : x = X  (t, θ, v)} .
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We can deﬁne the payment as ∞ if an allocation is never optimal, i.e. V  = ∅. For every allocation
x such that V  (t, θ, x) = ∅ there exists at least one type v such that the agent would receive this
allocation x if he reports v in the direct mechanism of Theorem 2. The payment of the mechanism
described in Theorem 2 depends only on the allocation, but not on the type v. Thus, we have that
the following payment implements the virtual value maximizing allocation in an indirect mechanism:
⎧
⎪
⎨inf{p(t, θ, v) : v ∈ V  (t, θ, x)}, if V  (t, θ, x) = ∅;
p̃(t, θ, x) =
⎪
⎩∞,
else .
The revenue maximizing mechanism suggested by Proposition 6 is a menu over static contracts.
This means that it is suﬃcient that the payments and allocations at time t depend only on the time
t types and the time zero shocks.

3.3

The Relation between Discrete and Continuous Time Models

We should emphasize that the basic proof strategy to construct the optimal dynamic mechanism
in continuous time mirrors the approach taken in discrete time, see Eső and Szentes (2007) and
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a). As in these earlier seminal contributions, we obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions by using the envelope theorem using a small class of relevant deviations. Thus, the
valuable insights from discrete time carry over to continuous time. Similarly, for the suﬃcient conditions, we use monotonicity conditions and time separable allocation to guarantee that it remains
optimal for the agent to report truthfully after any misreport. Here, the continuous time version
of the suﬃciency arguments sometimes have the advantage that they can be expressed directly in
terms of the primitives of the stochastic process which we will illustrate in Section 6.
A brief, but more detailed comparison with the discrete time arguments might be instructive at
this point. Eső and Szentes (2007) and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) show that the additional
signals arriving after the initial period can be represented as signals that are orthogonal to the
past signals. In the present setting, the type vt at every point in time is represented as a function
φi of the initial shock θi , and an independent time t signal contribution (increment) dWt , i.e.
vt = φi (t, θi , Wti ). Our use of consistent deviations is similar to the deviations used in Pavan, Segal,
and Toikka (2014a) and Eső and Szentes (2014) where each agent reports the shock Wt after time
zero truthfully to establish revenue equivalence.
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We can also relate the relevant conditions that guarantee the monotonicity of the type with
respect to the initial shock. Indeed, our Assumptions 1 and 2 are closely related to the Assumptions
1 and 2 of Eső and Szentes. In particular, we show in the Appendix that our Assumption 1 is implied
by Assumption 1 in Eső and Szentes and thus weaker. Furthermore, Assumption 2 of our setup is
exactly equivalent to Assumption 2 in Eső and Szentes. Hence, the basic conditions on the payoﬀs
and the shocks extend the conditions of Eső and Szentes directly to an environment with many
periods and many (ﬂow) allocation decisions.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) observed in the context of a discrete time environment that
time-separability of the allocation plus monotonicity of the virtual value in θi and vti is suﬃcient
to ensure strong monotonicity of the virtual value maximizing allocation (monotonicity in θi and
vti after every history). Furthermore, they show that strong monotonicity is suﬃcient for the implementability of the virtual value maximizing allocation (Corollary 1). In Section 5 in the supplementary Appendix they use this insight to describe optimal mechanisms for discrete time situations
where the private information of the agent is not the initial state of the process, but a parameter
inﬂuencing the transitions.
As the allocation at time t does not change the set of possible allocations at later times our
environment is time-separable. Our assumptions are similar to the assumptions made in the section
discussing separable environments in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) in the sense that they
ensure strong monotonicity which in turn implies implementability of the virtual value maximizing
allocation. However, our assumptions on the stochastic process are weaker than the assumptions
made on the primitives in Proposition 1 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014a) to allow for the
geometric Brownian motion. The reason that we can establish suﬃciency under weaker assumptions
on the stochastic process lies in the multiplicative separable structure we assume between the type
and the allocation.
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4

Long-run Behavior of the Distortion

In this section we analyze how the allocative distortion behaves in the long-run. We are interested
in the expected social welfare generated by the revenue maximizing allocation compared to the
expected welfare generated by the socially optimal allocation. We begin with the following deﬁnition
and recall that the ﬂow social welfare s (·) as the sum of the ﬂow utilities over all agents, see (8).
Deﬁnition 4 (Vanishing Distortion).
The allocative distortion vanishes in the long-run if the social welfare generated by the revenue
maximizing allocation converges to the social welfare generated by the socially optimal allocation as
t → ∞:



lim E s t, vt , x(t, vt ) − s t, vt , x(t, J i (t, θ, vt )) = 0 .

t→∞

The characterization of the long-run behavior comes in two parts. We ﬁrst provide suﬃcient
condition for the long-run behavior to vanish. Then we provide necessary conditions for persistence
of allocative distortions in the long-run in the case of a single agent.
Proposition 7 (Long-run Behavior of the Distortion).
The following two statements characterize the long-run behavior of the distortion:
(a) The distortion vanishes in the long run if the expected type of any initial shock converges to the
expected type of the lowest shock, i.e.




lim E vt | θi = x − E vt | θi = θ → 0 .

t→∞

(19)

(b) If n = 1, u(t, x) = x, c(x) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex with 0 < c (x) ≤ D
and the expected type for a (non-zero measure) set of shocks does not converge to the expected
type of the lowest shock (i.e. (19) is not satisﬁed), then the allocative distortion does not vanish.
Proof. First note that the diﬀerence in the expected type between a random and the lowest initial
shock equals




E [vt ] − E vt | θi = θ = E φi (t, θi , Wti ) − φi (t, θ, Wti )

θ
1 − F (z) i
φθ (t, z, Wti )f (z)dz
=E
f (z)
θ


1 − F (θi ) i
i
i
=E
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) .
f (θi )
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Part (a): We prove that the distortion vanishes if limt→∞ E

1−F (θ i ) i
φθ (t, θ, Wt )
f (θ i )


= 0. We ﬁrst

show that the welfare loss at a ﬁxed point in time can be bounded by the diﬀerence between virtual
value J ∈ Rn and type v ∈ Rn
s(t, v, x (t, v)) − s(t, v, x (t, J))


=
v i ui (t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))

=





−


v i ui (t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))


−



−


v i ui (t, x i (t, J)) − c(x (t, J))

i∈N



J i ui (t, x i (t, J)) − c(x (t, J))

(vi − J i )ui (t, x i (t, J))


v i ui (t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))




i∈N

i∈N

i∈N

=

−

i∈N

i∈N

≤



−



J i ui (t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))

i∈N

(vi − J i )ui (t, x i (t, J))

i∈N

(v i − J i )(ui (t, x i (t, v)) − ui (t, x i (t, J)).

i∈N

As the set of possible allocations X is compact and ui is continuous there exists a constant C > 0
such that



(v i − J i )(ui (t, x i (t, v)) − ui (t, x i (t, J)) ≤ C

i∈N



(v i − J i ) .

i∈N

Hence the welfare loss resulting from the revenue maximizing allocation resulting from the revenue
maximizing allocation is linearly bounded by the diﬀerence between virtual value and type. As the
diﬀerence between vti and Jti equals

1−F (θ i ) i
φθ (t, θi , Wti )
f (θ i )

it follows that


E [s(t, vt , x (t, vt )) − s(t, vt , x (t, Jt ))] ≤ C E
(v i − J i )

=CE

i∈N

 1 − F (θi )

φiθ (t, θi , Wti )
i)
f
(θ
i∈N


= C E [vt ] − E vt | θi = θ .
Taking the limit t → ∞ gives the result.
Part (b): We prove that the distortion does not vanish in the long run if the expected type of any
initial shock does not converge to the expected type of the lowest initial shock. First, we prove that
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the distortion changes the allocation. As ui (t, x) = x is linear and c is convex this implies that the
function x → vx − c(x) is concave and has an interior maximizer for every (t, v). This implies that
for every point in time t and every type v
0 = v − c (x (t, v)) .
By the implicit function theorem
xv (t, v) =

1
c (x (t, v))

≥

1
.
D

Intuitively this means that the allocation is responsive to the type v. We calculate the change in
social welfare induced by the type v and the virtual valuation J
s(t, v, x (t, v)) − s(t, v, x (t, J)) = [vx (t, v) − c(x (t, v))] − [vx (t, J) − c(x (t, J))]
 v
x (t, z)dz − (v − J)x (t, J)
=
J v
x (t, z) − x (t, J)dz
=
J

(v − J)2
1 v
.
(z − J)dz =
≥
D J
2D
As the diﬀerence between type and virtual value is given by

1−F (θ i ) i
φθ (t, θi , Wti )
f (θ i )

taking expectations

yields


1
1 − F (θi ) i
i
i 2
E [s(t, v, x(v)) − s(t, v, x(J))] ≥
E (
φθ (t, θ , Wt ))
2D
f (θi )

2
2
1 − F (θi ) i
1
(E [vt ] − E [vt | θi = θ])
i
i
E (
φ
,
≥
(t,
θ
,
W
))
=
θ
t
2D
f (θi )
2D
where the middle step follows from Jensen’s inequality. As limt→∞ E [vt |θ = x ] − E [vt | θi = θ] = 0
for positive probability set of initial shock x it follows that limt→∞ E [vt ] − E [vt | θi = θ] = 0.
The suﬃcient condition for the allocative distortion to vanish requires that the conditional
expectation of the type vt at some distant horizon t converges for all initial realizations of the
shock, θ, to the conditional expectation of the type vt given the lowest initial shock θ. Clearly, in
any model where the initial state θ is the current state of a recurrent Markov process, such as in
Battaglini (2005), the suﬃcient condition will be satisﬁed as the inﬂuence of the initial state on the
distribution of the future states of the Markov process is vanishing.
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In turn, the failure of the suﬃcient condition is almost a necessary condition for the allocative
distortion to persist. However, in addition we need to guarantee that the allocation problem is
suﬃciently responsive to the conditional expectation of the agent everywhere. This can be achieved
by the linearity and convexity conditions in Proposition 4.2. We state the necessary conditions only
for the problem with a single agent. With many agents, we would have to be concerned with the
further complication that the distortion that each individual agent faces may be made obsolete by
the distortion faced by the other agents, and thus a more stringent, and perhaps less transparent
set of conditions would be required.

5

Repeated Sales

A common economic situation that gives rise to a dynamic mechanism design problem is the repeated
sales problem where the buyer is unsure about his future valuation for the good. Examples of such
situations are gym membership and phone contracts. At any given point in time the buyer knows
how much he values making a call or going to the gym, but he might only have a probabilistic
assessment on how much he values the service tomorrow or a year in the future. Usually, it is
harder for the buyer to assess how much he values the good at times that are further in the future.
Mathematically this uncertainty about future valuations can be captured by modelling the buyers
valuation as a stochastic process.
From the point of view of the seller the question arises whether the uncertainty of the buyer can
be used to increase proﬁts by using a dynamic contract. In reality a variety of dynamic contracts are
used, for example for gym memberships and mobile phone contracts, as documented in DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006) or Grubb and Osborne (2015):
1. Flatrates where the buyer only pays a ﬁxed fee regardless of his consumption.
2. Two-part tariﬀs where the buyer selects from a menu a ﬁxed fee and a price of consumption.
He pays the ﬁxed fee independent of his level of consumption. In addition the buyer has to
pay for his consumption. Tariﬀs with higher ﬁxed fees feature lower prices of consumption.
3. Two-part tariﬀs where the buyer selects from a menu a ﬁxed fee and a corresponding amount
of free consumption units. He pays the ﬁxed fee independent of his consumption. In addition
the buyer has to pay for his consumption if it exceeds the given threshold. Tariﬀs with higher
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ﬁxed fees feature higher amounts of free consumption.
4. Leasing contracts where the buyer selects the length of the lease term and the price charged
per unit of time.
While those dynamic contracts can be observed in a wide range of situations, their theoretical properties, surprisingly, have not been widely analyzed. Using a dynamic mechanism design
perspective, we can explain why and under what circumstances these speciﬁc features of dynamic
contracts and consumption plans might be oﬀered.
For the purpose of this section, we assume that ui (t, xit ) = xit for all i and ti , and the ﬂow utility
of the agent is described by
vt · xt − p t .
Hence vti immediately represents the willingness to pay of the agent in period t. We shall assume
that the type (vt )t∈R+ of the buyer follows a geometric Brownian motion which is shifted upwards
by v ≥ 0, i.e.
dvt = (vt − v)dWt ,

(20)

where (Wt )t∈R+ is a Brownian motion. The choice of the shifted geometric Brownian motion as the
type process ensures that the valuation vt for the good will be greater than v at every point in time
t. Furthermore, the valuation at time t is the agent’s best estimate of his valuation at later times
s > t, i.e.
vt = E[vs | vt ] .
For the moment, the initial shock θi is taken to be the initial type of the buyer v0 ∈ (v, ∞). We
assume that the distribution function F is such that v →

1−F (v)
f (v) v

is decreasing and f (v) ≥ 1/v.

At every point in time t the buyer chooses an amount of consumption xt ∈ X ⊆ R+ and pays
pt such that his overall utility equals
E





∞
0

e

−rt

(vt · xt − pt )dt .

In the following we describe the revenue maximizing dynamic contract oﬀered by a monopolistic
seller. In general, dynamic contracts could have complicated features as the payments at time t
could depend on all the past consumption decisions and messages sent by the agent. However we
will show, using the results of the previous section, in particular Proposition 6 that oﬀering a menu
of simple static contracts is suﬃcient to maximize the expected intertemporal revenue.
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To evaluate dynamic contracts from the sellers perspective, we assume that the seller faces
continuous, non-decreasing production cost c : X → R+ , such that his overall payoﬀ equals
 ∞

−rt
E
e (pt − c(xt ))dt .
0

The following results describes optimal contracts (indirect mechanism) for the seller.
Proposition 8 (Revenue Maximizing Contract).
An indirect revenue maximizing mechanism is given by a menu (m, p(m, xt )) of membership fees m
and consumption prices p(m, xt ) of the form
p(m, xt ) = A(m)c(xt ) − (A(m) − 1)v xt .
Thus, the optimal contract is of the following form: At time zero the seller oﬀers a menu of static
contracts each consisting of a time independent ﬁxed membership fee m ≥ 0, and a consumption
dependent payment:
p(m, xt ) = A(m)c(xt ) − [A(m) − 1] v xt .
The consumption dependent payment p consists of a price of consumption of A(m) ≥ 1 and
a linear consumption discount (A(m) − 1)vxt . If the buyer accepts a contract he has to pay the
membership fee m ≥ 0 independent of his consumption. At the same time he has to pay p(m, xt )
depending on his consumption xt in period t such that his overall payment at time t equals
pt = m + p(m, xt ) = m + A(m)c(xt ) − [(A(m) − 1] vxt .

(21)

The optimal ﬁxed fee m(v0 ) that is chosen by the agent at the beginning of the contracts depends
on the agent’s initial valuation v0 . It will be such that A(m(v0 )) =

v0
,
J(v0 )

where J(v) = v −

1−F (v)
f (v)

is the virtual value.
With the general characterization of the optimal contract given by Proposition 8 we next establish under what conditions in terms of the nature of the private information and the cost of
delivering the service c (x) which of the above mentioned contract features will arise as a part of an
optimal contract.
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5.1

Flat Rate Contracts

In a ﬂat rate contract the payment pt is constant over time and independent of the buyers consumption. As the buyers utility increases in the consumption level he will always consume the good at
the maximum possible intensity.
Assume the production cost c is constant and normalized to zero, the set of possible allocations
is given by X = [0, 1], and the minimal valuation v equals zero. A direct consequence of the
transfers described in (21) is the following result characterizing an optimal mechanism with zero
(marginal) cost of production: The optimal mechanism is a ﬂat rate where every agent who accepts
the contract at time zero, makes a constant ﬂow payment, independent of his consumption, and
consumes the maximal possible amount: xt = 1.
While the buyer enjoys a utility of vt from consuming the good he dislikes the payments p and
he will suﬀer from a negative ﬂow utility vt − p if vt < p. If his current valuation vt is below the
ﬂat rate price p, not only is his current ﬂow of utility negative, but also his expected continuation
utility of the contract:





∞

E

e

−rs

(vs − ps )dt | vt =

t

vt − p
.
r

(22)

However, as the agent is (legally) bound to the contract he is forced to make the payments. Hence
a ﬂat rate contract makes use of the fact that the agent can commit himself to future payments
and consumption before he learns his valuation.
As a consequence of condition (22) only the agents with an initial valuation v0 ≥ p accept the
contract. All agents with an initial valuation v0 < p reject the contract and never consume the
good no matter how high the consumption utility is at times t > 0.

5.2

Two-Part Tariﬀs

Having seen that zero marginal cost lead to ﬂat rate tariﬀs, the next section describes the optimal
contract for convex costs. Assume that the minimal valuation v equals zero and the cost function
c is strictly convex. By condition (21) a two-part tariﬀ where the agent pays m independent of his
consumption and A(m)c(x) depending on his consumption x is a revenue maximizing contract for
the principal. It is worth noting that a simple menu of static two-part tariﬀs can hence maximize
the revenue of the principal.

ValuationConsumption on a logscale
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Figure 1: The initial valuation v0 is exponentially distributed with mean 50 and the valuation
evolves as a geometric Brownian motion without drift.
We illustrate the structure of the two-part tariﬀ with the following quadratic cost function.
Example 1. Let c(x) = x2 /2 and the initial valuation be exponentially distributed with mean μ, i.e.
F (v0 ) = 1 − exp( vμ0 ) and v = 0. The optimal contract sets for every ﬁxed fee m ∈ (0, ∞) a price of
consumption xt equal to:



−1
x2t
−2mr(r − σ)
A (m) =
1 − exp
.
2
μ

Figure 1 illustrates Example 1 where the valuation evolves as a geometric Brownian motion
without drift. The solid lines are two paths of the valuation starting at an initial valuation of 60
(red) and 80 (blue) which coincide after time t = 45. The dashed lines are the consumption levels in
the revenue maximizing contract if the cost of production is quadratic c(x) = x2 /2. As the optimal
consumption is linear in the valuation they are parallel on a logarithmic scale. Note, that even after
the valuations coincide the consumption levels of the agents with diﬀerent initial valuations diﬀer
and the optimal consumption level react with diﬀering intensity to changes in the valuations. The
consumption of the agent in the welfare maximizing contract would exactly equal his valuation.
Figure 2 illustrates how the consumption at time t depends on the time zero valuation in the
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Revenue Maximizing Menu of Contracts
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Figure 2: Illustration of Example 1: v = 0, c(x) = x2 /2, v0 exponentially distributed with mean
μ = 1 and a constant discount factor of r = 1.
context of Example 1. The picture on the left the displays the revenue maximizing menu of contracts
(two-part tariﬀs). The picture on the right displays the contract chosen by the consumer depending
on his initial valuation v0 . The blue line shows the ﬁxed fee m(v0 ) and the red line the cost multiplier
A(m(v0 )) in the contract chosen by a consumer with initial valuation v0 .

5.3

Free Minute Contract

We now consider the case in which the minimal type v of the agent is is strictly positive and that
the density at the minimal valuation is bounded away from zero, or f (v) > 1/v. In addition we
assume that the marginal cost of providing the good vanishes for small quantities, i.e. c (0) = 0.
When the agent decides how much to consume at time t he solves the maximization problem:
max {xvt − (m + A(m)c(x) − (A(m) − 1)vx)} .
x
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This leads to the ﬁrst order condition:
0 = vt − A(m)c (x) + (A(m) − 1)v ⇔ c (x) = v +

(vt − v)
.
A(m)

As the marginal cost of providing the good vanishes if the quantity goes to zero it follows that the
consumption of the agent is bounded from below at every point in time by c−1 (v). Hence we can
interpret the amount c−1 (v) as a quantity provided to the agent for free. This is a feature that is
common in mobile phone contracts. In such a contract the agent can consume a certain number of
minutes for free and only has to pay for the consumption exceeding this amount.

5.4

Leasing Contracts

So far, the initial private information pertained to the initial value of the geometric Brownian
motion. By contrast, now we consider the case where the initial private information θ of the agent
constitutes the drift of the geometric Brownian motion. The valuation vt then evolves according to:
dvt = vt (μdt + σdWt ) .
A solution to the above diﬀerential equation is given by:


σ2
vt = φ(t, θ, Wt ) = v0 exp (θ − )t + σWt ,
2

(23)

and the derivative of the type φ with respect to θ equals:
φθ = φt.
Thus the virtual value is now given by:

J(t, θ, vt ) = vt


1 − F (θ)
1−
t .
f (θ)

(24)

In terms of the cost of providing the service, we assume the same cost structure as in the above
analysis of the ﬂat rate contract, namely, the cost of production is constant and normalized to
zero and xt ∈ [0, 1]. Interestingly, the distortion is still formed on the basis of a multiplicative
handicap, but now the handicap factor is increasing linearly in time as expressed by the second
term of the virtual utility. It follows that in contrast to the above cases of an unknown initial value,
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the distortion is now growing over time. As vt is positive, it follows that the virtual valuation is
strictly positive until a deterministic time T is reached which is precisely given by the hazard rate:
L(θ) =

f (θ)
,
1 − F (θ)

and thereafter the virtual value turns negative. Thus, the allocation of the object to agent i ends
with probability one at time L(θ). As shown in the appendix, this contract can be implemented by
a constant leasing payment p(θ) the agent makes at every time t ∈ [0, L(θ)].
Corollary 1. The mechanism which allocates the object to the agent with shock θ if and only if
t ∈ [0, L(θ)] and requires a payment of
⎧
 (θ−r)L(θ)
θ
⎪
r
−1
e
⎨ −rL(θ)
−
v
0
θ−r
0
1−e
p(t, θ) =
⎪
⎩0

e(z−r)L(z) [L(z)(z−r)−1]
dz
(z−r)2



if t ∈ [0, L(θ)]
else

is revenue maximizing.
To establish the above formula for the payments we calculate the expected value that the agent
with initial shock θ derives from getting the object until time L(θ̂). By the envelope theorem the
payment equals this value minus the integral over the marginal value of those types with a lower
initial shock.
In a recent paper, Boleslavksy and Said (2013) derive the revenue maximizing contract in a
discrete time setting where the private information of a single agent is the uptick probability of a
multiplicative random walk. As it is well known, the geometric Brownian motion can be viewed as
the continuous time limit of the discrete time multiplicative random walk stochastic process. Thus,
it is naturally of interest to compare their results to the implications following our analysis. In
terms of the private information of the agent, the unknown drift in the geometric Brownian motion
here represents the unknown uptick probability analyzed in Boleslavksy and Said (2013). As the
general convergence result of the stochastic process itself would suggest, we can also establish, see
the Appendix for the details, that the continuous time limit of the virtual valuation derived in
Boleslavksy and Said (2013) is the virtual value derived above by (24). However, in the continuous
time limit the expression for the virtual value, see (24), becomes notably easier to express and
to interpret. The analysis in Boleslavksy and Said (2013) explicitly veriﬁes the validity of the
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incentive constraints in the case of a single agent. With the general approach taken here, we can
obtain suﬃcient conditions for the revenue optimal contract and associated allocations even in the
presence of many agents. In fact, the next section considers such an allocation problem, namely
the allocation of a single unit among competing bidders. This second class of allocation problems is
notably more restrictive in terms of the cost of providing the service, namely constant for a single
unit, but allows to draw some novel insight regarding the structure of intertemporal distortion with
many agents.

6

Sequential Auctions and Distortions

We illustrate the impact that the structure of the private information has on the intertemporal
policies and the allocative distortion within the context of a sequential auction model. The allocation
problem is as follows. At every point in time t, the owner of a single unit of a, possibly divisible,
object wishes to allocate it among the competing bidders, i = 1, ..., n. The allocation space is given

at every instant t is given by xit ∈ [0, 1] and ni=1 xit ≤ 1. The marginal cost of providing the object
is constant and normalized to zero. The ﬂow utility of each agent i is given by vti · xit − pit .
We can interpret the allocation process as a process of intertemporal licensing where the current
use of the object is determined on the basis of the past and current reports of the agents, and in
particular, the assignment of the object can move back and forth between the competing agents.
Alternatively, the description of the valuation could be rephrased as a description of the marginal
cost of producing a single good, and the associated allocation process is the solution to a long-term
procurement contract with competing producers. As in the static theory of optimal procurement,
the virtual value would then be replaced by the virtual cost, but the structure of the allocation
process would remain intact.

6.1

Arithmetic Brownian Motion

In the previous section we represented the valuation process by a geometric Brownian motion, now
we consider the arithmetic Brownian motion, thus indicating the versatility of the current approach.
The arithmetic Brownian motion vti is completely described by its initial value v0i and the drift μ
and the variance σ of the diﬀusion process Wt . The willingness to pay of agent i therefore evolves
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according to:
dvti = μdt + σdWti ,
so that the type of agent i, his willingness to pay, can be represented as:
vti = v0i + μt + σWti .

(25)

We analyze the incentive problem when either one of the three determinants of the Brownian motion,
the initial value, the drift or the variance is unknown, whereas the remaining two are commonly
known. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that even though we consider the same stochastic process, the nature
of the private information, i.e. about which aspect of the process the agent is privately informed, has
a substantial impact on the optimal allocation. In particular, we ﬁnd that the distortion is either
constant, increasing or random (and increasing in expectation) depending on the precise nature of
the private information.
Unknown Initial Value We begin with the case where the initial value of the Brownian motion,
v0i = θi , is private information to agent i, as are all future realizations of the Brownian motion, vti .
In contrast, the drift μ and the variance σ of the Brownian motion are assumed to be commonly
known. Given the representation of the Brownian motion (25), we have
vti = φi (t, θi , Wti ) = θi + μt + σWti .

(26)

The partial derivative of φi with respect to θ is given by φiθ = 1. It follows that the virtual value is
given by:
J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
,
f (θi )

(27)

and the distortion imposed by the revenue maximizing mechanism is constant over time. In every
period, the object is allocated to the agent i∗t with the highest virtual utility, provided that the
valuation is positive. Thus, the allocation proceeds by ﬁnding the bidder with the highest valuation,
after taking into account a handicap, that is determined once and for all through the report of the
initial shock.
Earlier, we gave a general description of the payments decomposed into an annualized up-front
payment m and a ﬂow payment pt . In the present auction environment, we can give an explicit
description of the ﬂow payments in terms of the virtual utility of the agents. The associated ﬂow
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transfer of the bidders, pit , which also follows directly from the logic of the second price auction are
given by:

⎧


⎨ maxj=i v j − 1−F (θj j ) +
t
f (θ )
pit =
⎩
0,

1−F (θ i )
,
f (θ i )

if i = i∗t ;
if i = i∗t .

(28)

Thus, it is only the winning bidder who incurs a ﬂow payment. By rewriting (28), we ﬁnd that
the winning bidder has to pay his valuation, but receives a discount, namely his information rent,
which is exactly equal to the diﬀerence in the virtual utility between the winning bidder and the
next highest bidder, i.e.
∗
pit

=

∗
vti



i∗

− J (t, θ

i∗

∗
, vti )



J (t, θ
− max
∗
j

j=i

j

, vtj )




.

(29)

By construction of the transfer function, the ﬂow net utility of the bidder is positive whenever he
is assigned the object, as
∗
vti

∗

≥

vtj

1 − F (θj ) 1 − F (θi )
+
,
−
f (θj )
f (θi∗ )

(30)

and thus, the ﬂow allocation proceeds as a “handicap” second price auction, where the price of the
winner is determined by the current value of the second highest bidder, as measured by the virtual
utility, and the “handicap” is computed as the diﬀerence between the constant handicap of the
current winner and the current second highest bidder. The above version of the handicap auction
appeared in Eső and Szentes (2007) in a two period model of a single unit auction. Similarly, Board
(2007) develops a handicap auction in a discrete time, inﬁnite horizon model, but where the object
is allocated only once, at an optimal stopping time. There, the handicap is represented as here,
by the constant terms, (1 − F (θj )) /f (θj ) and (1 − F (θi )) /f (θi ), but the second highest value
is computed as the continuation value of the remaining bidders, as in Bergemann and Välimäki
(2010).
Unknown Drift We now consider the case where the initial private information is the drift of the
Brownian motion. Let vti ∈ R+ be an arithmetic Brownian motion with drift θ and known variance
σ and known initial value, v0i :
vti = φi (t, θi , Wti ) = v0i + μt + σWti .

(31)
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The derivative of the valuation φi with respect to the initial private information θ, which is now
the drift of the Brownian motion, is given by φiθ = t. Thus the virtual value is now:
J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
t.
f (θi )

(32)

The ﬂow payment is of exactly the same form as (29), and the virtual utility function is given
by (32). The distortion is still formed on the basis of the handicap, by the inverse hazard rate
(1 − F (θi )) /f (θi ), but now the handicap is increasing linearly in time. In contrast to the case
of the unknown starting value, the distortion is growing deterministically over time, rather than
vanishing over time. Since vti might be growing as well, the deterministic increase in the distortion
does not allow us to conclude that the assignment of the object is terminated with probability one
at some ﬁnite time T , a conclusion that we arrived earlier in Section 5 where we considered the
geometric Brownian motion.
Unknown Variance We conclude the analysis with the case of unknown variance and the valuation vti then evolves according to:
vti = φi (t, θi , Wti ) = v0 + μt + θi Wti .

(33)

Now, the initial private information θi represents the volatility of the Brownian motion. The
derivative of the valuation φi with respect to the initial private information θi now takes the form:
φiθ =

φi − v0 − μt
θi

In consequence the virtual value of agent i can be expressed as:
1 − F (θi ) vti − v0 − μt
J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −
f (θi )
θi


1 − F (θi )
1 − F (θi )
+
= vti 1 −
(v0 + μt).
f (θi )θi
f (θi )θi
Note, that it follows from J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1−F (θ i )
Wti
f (θ i )

(34)

that the expected virtual value equals the

expected value for any time zero shock θi . The variance of the Brownian motion does not lend
itself to an ordering along the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance criterion, rather it is ordered by
second order stochastic dominance. Formally, in the case of unknown variance φi does not satisfy
the assumptions φiθ ≥ 0 and Assumption 2. But as those assumptions were only used to establish
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that the virtual value is increasing in θ, v if it takes positive values, we can dispense with them here
as we can ensure monotonicity here by requiring that μ, v0 ≤ 0.
The basic idea is to use the convexity of the objective function to guarantee that an increase
in variance leads to an increase in the expected (virtual) valuation. After all, if the virtual value
turns negative, the seller does not want to assign the object to the buyer, thus the revenue is ﬂat
and equal to zero. It therefore follows that the revenue of the seller has a convex like property. But
in contrast to the utility of the buyer, which is linear in vt , and hence strictly convex if truncated
below by zero, the virtual value of the seller has additional terms, as displayed by (34) which need
to be controlled to guarantee the monotonicity of the virtual utility. From the expression of the
virtual utility function we can immediately derive suﬃcient conditions for the monotonicity. Thus
if we assume that the initial value v0 is negative, v0 ≤ 0, and the arithmetic Brownian motion has
a negative drift μ ≤ 0, then we are guaranteed that the convexity argument is suﬃciently strong.
Formally, let θ̂ be the solution to θ̂ −

1−F (θ̂)
f (θ̂)

= 0. As


1 − F (θi )
i
i i
i
J (t, θ , vt ) ≤ vt 1 −
f (θi )θi

the virtual value J i (t, θi , vti ) is only positive if the valuation vti is negative, for all θi < θ̂. But this
implies that the gross expected utility of all agents with initial type θi < θ̂ is negative, and hence
they cannot generate a nonnegative revenue due to the ex ante participation constraint, and hence,
it can never be optimal to allocate to an agent with variance θi < θ̂. Thus, we ignore agents with
low variance θi < θ and never allocate the object to them. As
1−

1−F (θ)
f (θ)θ

1−F (θ)
f (θ)

is decreasing we have that

> 0 for all θ > θ̂ and hence J i (t, θi , vti ) is increasing in vti and θi for all vti > 0 , θi > θ̂.

Hence, by the argument of Proposition 5, there exists a payment such that truthful reporting of
valuations becomes optimal irrespective of the reported types. As the virtual value
J i (t, θi , φi (t, θi , Wti )) = Wti (θ −

1 − F (θ)
) + μt + v0
f (θ)

is increasing in θ whenever Wti > 0 and decreasing whenever Wti < 0 it follows that the product
Wti ui (t, x i (t, (θ̂i , θ−i ), vti ))
is increasing in the reported shock θ̂i . The derivative of the agents utility with respect to his initial
shock simpliﬁes to


E

T
0

e

−rt

Wti

i

i

i

u (t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ

−i

), vti ))




dt
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and thus, by the argument of Theorem 2, the virtual valuation maximizing allocation for the shocks
θ > θ̂ is incentive compatible.
The last two examples emphasize that our approach can accommodate not only private information about the initial state of a random process, but also private information about the structural
parameters of the stochastic process per se, such as the mean or the variance of the process.

6.2

Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

Finally we describe the implications for the revenue maximizing allocation if the stochastic process
is given by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which is the continuous-time analogue of the discretetime AR(1) process. This example is closely connected to the discrete time literature. Besanko
(1985) showed that the distortions induced by the discrete-time AR(1) process vanish for unknown
initial value of the process if and only if the process is mean-reverting. Furthermore, the AR(1)
process, was the leading example in the analysis of the impulse response function in Pavan, Segal,
and Toikka (2014a).
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process vti is completely described by its initial value v0i , the mean
reversion level μ, the mean reversion speed m ≥ 0 and the variance σ ≥ 0 of the diﬀusion process
Bt . The willingness to pay of agent i evolves according to the stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dvti = m(μ − vt )dt + σdBti ,
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process can be represented using
a distinct Brownian motion B̃ as:
σe−mt
vt = v0 e−mt + μ(1 − e−mt ) + √
B̃2mt −1 .
2m
Hence we can deﬁne the process W as a time-changed Brownian Motion by
e−mt
Wtm = √ B̃2mt −1 .
2m
Using W we can represent the valuation of the agent as
vt = v0 e−mt + μ(1 − e−mt ) + σWtm .

(35)
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Unknown Initial Value Consider the case where the valuation process is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process and the initial valuation is private information, i.e. v0i = θi . Given the representation (35)
it follows that
∂φi (t, θi , WTi )
= e−mt .
∂θi
Thus, Assumption 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. The virtual value J i equals
i

J (t, θ

i

, vti )

=

vti

1 − F (θi ) −mt
e
−
.
f (θi )

Hence the optimal mechanism is a handicap mechanism with a deterministic handicap that is
exponentially decreasing over time. As the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in the long run converges
to a stationary distribution which is independent of the starting value θi , Proposition 7 applies
and the distortion vanishes in the long run. Intuitively the initial valuation does not change the
expected valuation in the long run.
Unknown Long Run Average We can also take the structural parameter of the stochastic
process to be the private information of the agent, that is we can take the expected long run
average of the process to be the private information of agent i, i.e. μ = θi . Given the representation
(35) it follows that
∂φit
= 1 − e−mt .
∂θi
Thus, Assumption 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. The virtual value J i equals
J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
(1 − e−mt ) .
f (θi )

Hence the optimal mechanism is a handicap mechanism with a deterministic handicap that is
increasing over time. As the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process converges in the long run to a stationary
distribution which depends on the long run average θi the distortion increases in the long run.
Intuitively, the expected valuation converges to the long run average θi , and so does the virtual
value, it converges to the long rune average of the virtual value as well. In a notable recent
contribution, Skrzypacz and Toikka (2015) consider dynamic mechanisms for repeated trade under
private information. In particular they analyze the discrete time version of the mean-reverting
process in which the persistence of the stochastic process is private information, the equivalent of
the mean-reversion speed m here. They establish that the allocative distortion is increasing over
time rather than decreasing as when the initial state is private information.

38

7

Conclusion

We analyzed a class of dynamic allocation problems with private information in continuous time. In
contrast to much of the received literature in dynamic mechanism design, the private information of
each agent was not restricted to the current state of the Markov process. In particular, the private
information was allowed to pertain to structural parameters of the stochastic process such as the
drift of the arithmetic or geometric Brownian motion, or the speed of the mean-reverting process. By
allowing for a richer class of private information structures, we gained a better understanding about
the nature of the distortion due the private information. In contrast to the Markovian settings,
where the distortions induced by the revenue maximizing allocation are typically vanishing over
time, we have shown that the distortion can be constant, increasing or decreasing over time. The
analysis of the private information in terms of the stochastic ﬂow, the equivalent of the impulse
response functions in continuous time, allowed us directly link the nature of the private information
to the nature of the intertemporal distortion.
A distinct advantage of the continuous and time-separable approach taken here is that we could
oﬀer explicit solutions, in terms of the optimal allocation, the level of distortion and the transfer
payments. We highlighted this advantage in the analysis of the repeated sales environment in which
we gave complete, explicit and surprisingly simple solutions to a class of sales/licensing problems.
In particular, we showed that we can implement the dynamic optimal contract by means of an
essentially static contract, a membership contract, that displayed such common empirical features
as ﬂat rates, free consumption units and two-part tariﬀs.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. As there is no risk of confusing agents we drop the upper indices in the
proof and denote by (θ, v) the type and the type of agent i. Assume that the virtual value is
positive J(t, θ, v) > 0. We ﬁrst prove the monotonicity in v and than in θ.
Part 1: J(t, θ, v) > 0 ⇒ Jv (t, θ, v) ≥ 0:
Note that


1 − F (θ) i
1 − F (θ) φiθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
.
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) = v 1 −
J(t, θ, v) = v −
f (θ)
f (θ) φi (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
As φiθ > 0 it follows that J(t, θ, v) ≤ v and hence v ≥ 0. Consequently the second term needs to be
positive as well. Clearly, v → v is non-decreasing. As φiθ /φi is decreasing in w by (4) and w(t, θ, v)
is increasing in v, so the second term is increasing in v.
Part 2: J(t, θ, v) > 0 ⇒ Jθ (t, θ, v) ≥ 0 :
It remains to prove that the virtual value J(t, θ, v) = v −
in θ. First, note that

1−F (θ)
f (θ)

1−F (θ) i
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
f (θ)

is non-decreasing

is decreasing in θ by assumption. Second, note that 0 = φiθ + φiw wθ and

hence
∂ i
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) = φiθθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) + φiθw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))wθ (t, θ, v)
∂θ
φi (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
= φiθθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) − φiθw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) iθ
.
φw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
Now we replace w(t, θ, v) by w and prove that the derivative is negative for any w ∈ R :

 i
φθθ (t, θ, w) φiθw (t, θ, w)
i
= φθ (t, θ, w)
− i
φiθ (t, θ, w)
φw (t, θ, w)


∂
∂
i
i
i
= φθ (t, θ, w)
log(φθ (t, θ, w)) −
log(φw (t, θ, w)
∂θ
∂θ
 i

∂
φθ (t, θ, w)
i
= φθ (t, θ, w) log
∂θ
φiw (t, θ, w)
≤ 0.
The last step follows as
well.

φiθ (t,θ,w)
φiw (t,θ,w)

is decreasing in θ by (5), and so the logarithm is decreasing as
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Proof of Proposition 4. We have that




ŷ



y

ŷ

β(y, ŷ) − p(ŷ) = β(y, ŷ) − β(ŷ, ŷ) +
β1 (z, z)dz =
β1 (z, ŷ)dz +
β1 (z, z)dz
0
ŷ
0
 y
 y
 y
=
β1 (z, ŷ) − β1 (z, z)dz +
β1 (z, z)dz ≤
β1 (z, z)dz = β(y, y) − p(y) .
0

ŷ

0

Proof of Proposition 8. Note that a strong solution for the geometric Brownian motion is given by:

 2
σ
vt = v0 exp − t + σWt + v.
2
By (15) the virtual value equals

J(t, v0 , vt ) = vt

1 − F (v0 )
1−
f (v0 )v0


+

1 − F (v0 )
v.
f (v0 )v0

(36)

As shown in Theorem 1 the seller aims at maximizing

 T
−rt
e (Jt xt − c(xt )) .
E
0



Deﬁne A(v0 ) = 1 −

1−F (v0 )
f (v0 )v0

−1

. At every point in time t the seller aims at choosing the consumption

level xt that maximizes the virtual value


 
1 − F (v0 )
1 − F (v0 )
+
v x − c(x)
J(t, v0 , vt )xt − c(x) = vt 1 −
f (v0 )v0
f (v0 )v0
= A(v0 )−1 (vt x − A(v0 )c(x) + (A(v0 ) − 1)xv)
Consequently a payment of pt = A(v0 )c(x) − (A(v0 ) − 1)xv perfectly aligns the interest of the buyer
and the seller at every point in time t > 0. It remains to prove that it is incentive compatible for
the buyer to report his time zero type truthfully.
Let us ﬁrst deal with the case where v = 0. Note that in this case Assumption 1 and 2 are
satisﬁed and thus Proposition 2 yields the monotonicity of the virtual valuation J(t, v0 , vt ) in v0
and vt conditional on Jt ≥ 0. If v is greater zero it follows from f (v) > 1/v and the monotonicity
of

1−F (v0 )
f (v0 )v0

that for all v0 ≥ v
1−

1 − F (v0 )
> 0.
f (v0 )v0

Hence, the virtual value deﬁned in (36) is increasing in vt and v0 . The proof of Theorem 2 show
that this is suﬃcient for for the existence of a payment that makes it incentive compatible to report
the time zero valuation truthfully.
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Consider now the special case of quadratic costs, c(x) = x2 /2 and let the initial valuation v0 be
exponentially distributed with mean v̂:
P[v0 ≤ x] = 1 − exp (−v0 /v̂) .
Consider the situation where the agent decided on a contract (m, A(m)) and the consumption tariﬀ
A(m) is ﬁxed. The optimal consumption of the agent at time t is given by


vt
x2
{xt } = arg max x vt − A(m)
=
.
x≥0
2
A(m)
Hence, the agents expected time zero utility from the contract is

 ∞

 ∞
−rt
−rt
max E
e (vt xt − m − A(m)c(xt )) = E
e
(xt )t∈R+

vt2
−m
2A(m)
0
m
v0
− .
=
2A(m)(r − σ)
r

0



(37)

Hence, if the agent will choose his optimal contract he will maximize (37) over m select a contract
(m, A(m)) only based on his time zero valuation v0 . Let us denote by m(v0 ) the ﬁxed fee chosen by
the agent of initial valuation v0 . In the optimal contract
⎧
⎪
⎨ v0
if v0 ≥ μ
v0 −μ
A(m(v0 )) =
⎪
⎩∞
else .
Hence all buyers who initially have a valuation below the average time zero valuation μ will be
excluded and never consume the good no matter how high their future valuation is.
Proof of Corollary 1. We can explicitly calculate the time zero expected utility the agent derives
from consuming the good when she reported a shock θ̂ if her true shock equals θ

 L(θ̂)
 L(θ̂)
L(θ̂)
−r t
−r t
V̂ (θ, θ̂) = E
e vt dt =
e E [vt ] dt =
e−r t eθ t v0 dt
0


= v0

0


(θ−r)t t=L(θ̂)

e
θ−r

= v0
t=0

0

e(θ−r)L(θ̂) − 1
.
θ−r

Thus, time zero transfers that make this allocation incentive compatible are given by
 θ
 θ (z−r)L(z)
∂V
e(θ−r)L(θ) − 1
e
[L(z)(z − r) − 1]
V̂ (θ, θ) −
−
dz .
(z, z)dz = v0
θ−r
(z − r)2
0 ∂ θ̂
0
If payment is made as a ﬂow transfer on the time interval [0, L(θ)] we need to adjust it by multiplying
with r(1 − e−rL(θ) )−1 .
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Relationship to Eső and Szentes (2007)
In Lemma 2 Eső and Szentes show that their Assumption 1 is equivalent to (in our notation)
φiθw (t, θ, w) ≤ 0,

(A)

and their Assumption 2 is equivalent to (in our notation)
φiθθ (t, θ, w)
φiθw (t, θ, w)
≤
.
φiθ (t, θ, w)
φiw (t, θ, w)

(B)

As
∂ φiθ
φiθw φi − φiθ φiw
=
,
∂w φi
φi2
Assumption 1 of Eső and Szentes implies our Assumption 1 and is thus stronger. As


∂ φiθ
φiθθ φiw − φiθ φiθw
φiθ φiθθ φiθw
.
=
= i
− i
∂θ φiw
φi2
φw φiθ
φw
w
Hence, Assumption 2 of our setup is exactly equivalent to Assumption 2 in Eső and Szentes.

Relationship to Boleslavksy and Said (2013)
We brieﬂy establish the relationship between the multiplicative random walk in the discrete time
environment of Boleslavksy and Said (2013) and the geometric Brownian motion analyzed here. Let
(Xk )k∈N be a multiplicative random walk, i.e.
⎧
⎪
⎨u Xk , with probability θ,
Xk+1 =
⎪
⎩d Xk , with probability 1 − θ ;
for some d < 1 < u and let the uptick probability θ ∈ (0, 1) be the private information. Boleslavksy
and Said (2013) show, see page 11, Eq. (7), that the virtual value in period k equals3


u − d 1 − F (θ)
vki 1 −
1{Xs =dXs−1 }
.
d(1
−
θ)
f
(θ)
s≤k
3

For convenience we translated their result into our notation. We use k for the period to clearly diﬀerentiate

between periods and physical time.
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In the next step we let the period length Δ go to zero. To do so let d ≡ dΔ , u ≡ uΔ and t ≡ Δk ∈ N.
The virtual value at the physical time t thus equals
⎞
⎛
 1 − F (θ)
 u

⎠.
1{Xs =dXs−1 } ( )Δ − 1
vti ⎝1 −
d
f
(θ)(1
−
θ)
t
s≤ Δ

Note that



t
s≤ Δ

1{Xs =dXs−1 } is Binomial distributed and converges to its expectation for Δ → 0,

i.e.
lim

Δ→0


t
s≤ Δ

⎡
1{Xs =dXs−1 } = E ⎣


t
s≤ Δ

⎤
1{Xs =dXs−1 } ⎦ = (1 − θ)

t
.
Δ

1
Δ

( ud )Δ − 1 = 1 we have that the virtual value goes to:


 1 − F (θ) 
 1 − F (θ) 
t  u Δ
1  u Δ
i
i
( ) −1
= vt 1 − t
( ) −1
vt 1 − (1 − θ)
Δ d
f (θ)(1 − θ)
Δ d
f (θ)


1 − F (θ)
t ,
= vti 1 −
f (θ)

As limΔ→0

which establishes the convergence to the virtual value derived earlier in (24).
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Eső, P., and B. Szentes (2007): “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions,” Review of
Economic Studies, 74, 705–731.
(2014): “Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result,” Oxford University and LSE.
Garrett, D., and A. Pavan (2012): “Managerial Turnover in a Changing World,” Journal of
Political Economy, 120(879-925).
Grubb, M., and M. Osborne (2015): “Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning and
Bill Shock,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Kakade, S., I. Lobel, and H. Nazerzadeh (2013): “Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and
the Virtual Pivot Mechanism,” Operations Research, 61, 837–854.

45
Kunita, H. (1997): Stochastic Flows and Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Milgrom, P., and I. Segal (2002): “Envelope Theorem for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” Econometrica, 70, 583–601.
Pavan, A., I. Segal, and J. Toikka (2014a): “Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian
Approach,” Econometrica, 82, 601–653.
(2014b): “Supplement to ”Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach”,”
Econometrica Supplemental Material, 82, 1–16.
Rochet, J.-C. (1987): “A Necessary and Suﬃcient Condition for Rationalizability in a QuasiLinear Context,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16, 191–200.
Skrzypacz, A., and J. Toikka (2015): “Mechanisms for Repeated Trade,” American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.

